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INTRODUCTION
The 1993 trademark decisions' rendered by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit address many issues of great relevance
to trademark practitioners. The Federal Circuit addressed a number
of cases of first impression and it continued to develop law interpret-
ing the intent-to-use provisions of the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 (TLRA).2 In the precedential 1993 Federal Circuit trademark
decisions, appellants fared unusually well, with the court either
reversing or vacating a majority of the lower tribunals' judgments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
A few of the trademark decisions from the Federal Circuit in 1993
were particularly significant for procedural reasons. In one decision,
the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the decision of the trial
court on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion in
declining to issue a preliminary injunction. In another decision, the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the decision of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board granting a petitioner's motion for summary
judgment and cancelling a respondent's trademark registration.
A. Preliminary Injunctions
In Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok International Ltd.,' the Federal
Circuit applied the standard of review4 and likelihood-of-confusion
1. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered 10 precedential decisions
affecting trademark law in 1993. SeeJean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Martahus v. Video Duplication Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d
1569,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In reCompagnie Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d
841, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re De Luxe, N.V., 990 F.2d 607, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Lloyd's Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli's, Inc., 987 F.2d 766,25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1993); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988) (allowing person with bona fide intention to use trademark
in commerce to seek registration of mark with Patent and Trademark Office by filing application
that describes, inter alia, use of mark and applicant's good faith belief that no one else is
authorized to use mark).
3. 998 F.2d 985, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
4. Payless Shoe Source, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985,987,27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that court reviews procedural matters under law of circuit
in which district court sits) (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,
1574-75, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 471 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Interpreting Tenth Circuit law, the
court in Payless determined that "the denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed to determine
whether 'the trial court's action was clearly erroneous or constitutes an abuse of discretion.'"
Id. at 988, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (quoting Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve
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analysis previously adopted by the Tenth Circuit.' The Federal
Circuit held that the trial court had abused its discretion by both
failing to consider adequately the extent of post-sale confusion
between the athletic footwear of Reebok International Ltd. (Reebok)
and Payless Shoesource, Inc. (Payless) and thus finding that there was
no likelihood of confusion.6 The trial court in Payless had denied
Reebok's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Payless from
infringing Reebok's trademarks, trade dress, and design patents.
This determination was based in part on the trial court's conclusion
that Reebok had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of its claims.' Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit's acknowl-
edgement of Reebok's heavy burden on appeal,9 and that the
"likelihood of success on the merits" is only one factor to consider in
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded the case on the grounds that "the
[trial] court's error affected its findings with regard to the other
preliminary injunction factors.""° Perhaps the most remarkable
Bank, 665 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1981)). According to the Federal Circuit, Otero teaches:
A moving party seeking preliminary injunctive relief in the Tenth Circuit must
establish: (1) a substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually prevail on the
merits; (2) a showing that the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless an injunction
issues; (3) proof that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage
the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) a showing that the
injunction, if granted, would not be adverse to the public interest.
Id. (citing Otero, 665 F.2d at 278).
5. The Federal Circuit identified four factors used by the Tenth Circuit in resolving
likelihood-of-confusion claims:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-mark... ; (b)
the intent of the actor in adopting the designation; (c) the relation in use and manner
of marketing between goods or services marketed by the actor and those marketed by
the other;, (d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
Id. at 988, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (quoting Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711
F.2d 934, 940, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 209, 215 (10th Cir. 1983)). The court also noted that this
list is not exhaustive and no one factor is dispositive. Id. (citingJordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld
Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1987)).
6. Id. at 989, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519-20.
7. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 804 F. Supp. 206, 216, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1130, 1138 (D. Kan. 1992). Because this Article covers only trademark decisions
rendered by the Federal Circuit, the trial court's resolution of Reebok's design patent claims will
not be discussed.
8. Id. (concluding that even if Reebok could have proven success on merits, court would
have denied injunction because of substantial financial hardship injunction would impose on
Payless; due to lack of urgency evidenced by fact that Payless had been marketing some brands
of shoes that were subject of suit since mid-to-late 1980s; and due to negative impact on public
interest).
9. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 988, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
10. Id. at 991, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. Under those circumstances, the Federal
Circuit concluded that a remand was appropriate. Id. (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow,
748 F.2d 556, 559, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 128, 130 (10th Cir. 1984)).
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aspect of the Payless decision is the Federal Circuit's determination
that the trial court, which was located within the Tenth Circuit, had
abused its discretion by failing to consider the extent of post-sale
confusion, a factor the Tenth Circuit had not included in its
likelihood-of-confusion test.11
In response to complaints by Reebok, a well-known manufacturer
and retailer of brand-name footwear, Payless, a retailer of low- and
medium-priced private-label shoes, filed a declaratoryjudgment action
against Reebok, seeking a determination that its footwear did not
infringe Reebok's trademark, trade dress, or design patent rights. 2
Reebok counterclaimed, alleging federal trademark infringement,"
trade dress infringement, 14 patent infringement, 5  and unfair
competition under federal law and Kansas common law. 6 Reebok's
counterclaims were addressed to five models of shoes sold by
Payless. 7
The trial court denied Reebok's preliminary injunction motion in
part because it concluded that Reebok had failed to prove a substan-
tial likelihood of success on the merits of its substantive claims. 8
The trial court acknowledged that Reebok and Payless shoes were
"similar in appearance,",9 but it concluded that other factors
"weigh[ed] strongly against the likelihood that a consumer will be
confused when confronted in the marketplace with the Reebok and
11. Id. at 989-90, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-19. The Tenth Circuit case setting forth the
factors relevant to determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion does not mention
post-sale confusion. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 209, 215 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)).
12. Payless, 998 F.2d at 986, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
13. Id. For its federal trademark infringement claim, Reebok claimed protection under §
32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988). Payless, 998 F.2d at 986, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1517.
14. Payless, 998 F.2d at 986, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. For its claims of federal unfair
competition (false designation of origin and false description and representation in the sale of
its products) and trade dress infringement, Reebok claimed protection under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Payless, 998 F.2d at 986 n.1, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 n.1.
15. Payless, 998 F.2d at 986, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)'at 1517. For its claim of federal design
patent infringement, Reebok claimed protection under 35 U.S.C. § 271. Payeas, 998 F.2d at 986,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
16. Payless, 998 F.2d at 986, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
17. Id. According to Reebok, Payless' ProWings HK 48 shoe infringed Reebok's
STARCREST and STRIPECHECK trademarks and the trade dress of its "Freestyle" shoes; Payless'
ProWings 9620 shoe infringed R6ebok's STARCREST mark and the trade dress of its "Princess"
shoe; Payless' ProWings 9153 shoe infringed the trade dress of Reebok's "THE PUMP" shoe and
one of Reebok's design patents; Payless' XJ 900 shoe infringed the trade dress of Reebok's
"Omni Zone II" shoe and a second Reebok design patent; and Payless' Attack Force 9160 shoe
infringed the trade dress of Reebok's "Blacktop the Boulevard" shoe and a third design patent.
Id. at 986-87, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
18. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 804 F. Supp. 206, 212, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1130, 1135 (D. Kan. 1992).
19. Id. at 211, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
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the Payless shoes."20  Important to the trial court's likelihood-of-
confusion analysis were the vast differences in the manner of
marketing and the channels of trade employed by Reebok and
Payless. 21 For example, the trial court found that Payless and
Reebok shoes were never sold in the same stores, that Payless shoes
were only available in Payless stores, that Payless shoes generally sold
for much less than Reebok shoes, and that the self-service nature of
Payless stores required customers to be highly knowledgeable
concerning the selection of Payless shoes.22 With respect to
Reebok's post-sale confusion argument, the trial court noted that no
precedent in the Tenth Circuit supported the theory of post-sale
confusion and found that, in any event, "the likelihood of post-sale
confusion is slight."'
Without ruling that the trial court's factual finding of slight post-
sale confusion between Reebok and Payless shoes was clearly
erroneous, the Federal Circuit labeled the finding "conclusory" and
declined to give it meaningful weight.24 In support of its position,
the Federal Circuit explained: "The district court's erroneous focus
solely on pre-sale confusion factors in finding no likelihood of success
on the merits of Reebok's trademark and trade dress claims unques-
tionably influenced its evaluation as to whether Reebok would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction was denied."'k
In so doing, the Federal Circuit appeared to substitute its judgment
for the trial court's conclusion as to post-sale confusion, explaining
that consideration of post-sale confusion was "singularly warranted" in
this case.26 Despite the fact that such a substitution exceeds the
court's mandate as an appellate court,27 the decision was unwarrant-
20. Id. at 212, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
21. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
22. Id.
23. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. According to Reebok's claim, likelihood of confusion
would occur when a consumer confused the vinyl Payless shoe with the Reebok shoe, which the
Payless shoe closely resembled. The consumer may find the vinyl cheap looking and purchase
from some manufacturer other than Reebok. Id.
24. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 n.4, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1516, 1519 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting trial court's finding of slight post-sale
confusion because it was premised on lack of Tenth Circuit precedent concerning post-sale
confusion).
25. Id. at 991, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the trial court
did not focus "solely" on the issue of presale confusion; it specifically found the likelihood of
post-sale confusion to be "slight." Paykss, 804 F. Supp. at 212, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
26. Payless, 998 F.2d at 989, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
27. Cf. LA. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1134,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1926 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Mayer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According
to Judge Mayer.
It is apparent that the only way to come to any other conclusion is for this court to
reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court, and to substitute its 'hunch' for
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ed because the theory of post-sale confusion was not the law in the
Tenth Circuit, and the Federal Circuit was merely predicting that the
theory "would likely be adopted by the Tenth Circuit if it considered
the issue head-on.""
In any event, the Federal Circuit's substitution of its own judgment
for that of the trial court was unnecessary. The trial court specifically
stated that it would have been reluctant to grant the preliminary
injunction even if Reebok had been able to demonstrate that it was
likely to succeed on the merits of its likelihood-of-confusion claim
because each of the three remaining preliminary injunction factors
weighed "decidedly in Payless' favor."2
B. Summary Judgment
In Lloyd's Food Products, Inc. v. Eli's, Inc.,3" the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the decision of the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (Board) granting Eli's motion for summary judgment
and cancelling Lloyd's trademark registration.3 Based on prior use
and registration, petitioner Eli's had claimed likelihood of confusion
between its LLOYD'S service mark for restaurant services and
respondent's LLOYD'S Design trademark for barbecued meat and
sauce,3 2 seeking cancellation of Lloyd's trademark under section 14
of the Lanham Act.3 3  On the issue of likelihood of confusion
the district court's judgment. This is an impermissible intrusion on the fact finding
role of the district court, and a violation of the proper role of an appellate court.
Id. Arguably, the Federal Circuit's appellate review role does not properly involve weighing facts
found by the trial court; instead, it involves an analysis of whether factual findings are clearly
erroneous. See Payless, 998 F.2d at 988, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-19 (stating earlier in its
decision that its standard of review under Tenth Circuit cases permitted it to review decision for
clearly erroneous findings of fact and exercise of abuse of discretion). Because the Federal
Circuit did not find the trial court's finding of slight post-sale confusion clearly erroneous, it is
difficult to understand the basis for the court's decision to vacate and remand the case.
28. Payless, 998 F.2d at 989, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
29. See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 804 F. Supp. 206, 216, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1130, 1138 (D. Kan. 1992) ("The balance of harms in this case tips decidedly in Payless'
favor."); see also supra note 4 (setting out preliminary injunction factors). The court concluded
that the preliminary injunction, if granted, would affect Payless to a far greater degree than a
denial would affect Reebok, and that the injunction might even have been "devastating" to
Payless. Payless, 804 F. Supp. at 216, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. Finally, the trial court found
that the preliminary injunction would be adverse to the public interest. Id.
30. 987 F.2d 766, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
31. Lloyd's Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli's, Inc., 987 F.2d 766,766-67, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2027,
2028 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
32. Id. at 767, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2028.
33. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988) (allowing any person to petition under § 14 of Lanham
Act for cancellation of existing registration on belief that petitioner will be injured by continued
registration); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988) (requiring Commissioner of Patent and
Trademark Office to refuse to register trademark that so resembles another, previously
registered, trademark as to cause confusion). The Lanham Act is the popular name for the
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between the marks, the Board concluded that there was no genuine
issue of material fact that would warrant a trial.3 4
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that it was responsible for
reviewing the Board's "determination of whether there is a likelihood-
of-confusion or not ... as a question of law based on underlying
facts," and that it "reviews substantive and procedural aspects of the
[B]oard's summary judgment decision de novo."5 The court then
reversed the Board's determination on likelihood-of-confusion,
concluding that the Board had dealt improperly with the evidence in
the record.36
The Federal Circuit first held that the Board had improperly
disregarded the telephone directory evidence 7 of various third-party
uses submitted by respondent Lloyd's." Addressing this evidence,
the Board had mechanically recited its frequently stated rule: "It is
well settled that search reports and telephone directories listing marks
and entities containing the term are, incompetent by themselves to
prove that those marks and trade names are in use or that the public
is exposed to them."39 The court was not persuaded. Distinguishing
between use sufficient to support a trademark and use sufficient to
support a service mark,'4 the court confirmed the rule's applicability
to trademark use but held that the rule had no application to service
mark use.4 According to the court, "Lloyd's Foods' threshold
showing that the mark appears in advertising, in the form of current
listings in the yellow and white pages, carries the presumption that
the service mark is being used by third parties in connection with the
Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
34. Lloyd's, 987 F.2d at 767, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2028.
35. I&, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2029 (citing Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show,
Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 850, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
36. Id. at 767-68, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2029.
37. Id. at 768, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2029 (concluding that Board had improperly
disregarded Lloyd's evidence because it confused service marks with marks for goods).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 732
(T.TA.B. 1984); In re Hub Distrib., Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284 (T.T.B. 1983)).
40. Id. The court noted:
A service mark is different from a mark for goods [trademark], especially in the
manner it is used in commerce," because in order for the use to be legally sufficient,
a trademark requires placement of the mark directly on the goods themselves or their
containers, whereas the former only requires use "in conjunction with the offering and
providing of a service.
Id.
41. Id. The court distinguished the cases cited by the Board in support of the rule by
noting that "[t]he marks at issue in the cases relied upon by the board were used in conjunction
with the sale of goods, not with the provision of services." Id.
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offering of the advertised services."42 For that reason, the court
concluded that the Board had impermissibly disregarded the directory
listings.43
Second, the court held that the Board impermissibly gave consider-
able weight to testimony from declarants who were related to the
petitioner and who had not been "shown to be representative of the
consuming public."" Finally, the court ruled that the Board had
inappropriately disregarded "the requirement that 'a party must show
something more than that similar or even identical marks are used for
food products and for restaurant services."' 45 Because there was only
a general similarity between the food on the menu in Eli's restaurant
and the food packaged by Lloyd's, the court held that the Board had
erred in determining that customers would be confused in believing
that Eli's was expanding into packaged food sales.4"
II. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
Many of the most significant trademark decisions of the Federal
Circuit in 1993 dealt with substantive issues: trade dress protection
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, likelihood of confusion,
priority, primarily geographically descriptive marks, merely descriptive
marks, and assignment of section 44 trademark applications.
A. Trade Dress Protection Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
In L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co.,4 the Federal Circuit
addressed whether various athletic shoes sold by the Thom McAn
Shoe Co. and the Melville Corp. (collectively Melville) had infringed
the trade dress- rights of L.A. Gear, Inc. (L.A. Gear).4" In an
unpublished decision, the district court had concluded that L.A.
Gear's trade dress was protectable and that Melville had infringed
L.A. Gear's trade dress rights.49 On appeal, Melville argued that L.A.
Gear should not have prevailed at trial because its trade dress was
functional and lacked secondary meaning, and because the labeling
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2029-30.
45. Id. at 769, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030 (quotingJacobs v. International Multifoods
Corp., 668 F.2d 1234, 1236, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 642 (Fed. Cir. 1982)).
46. Id.
47. 988 F.2d 1117, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
48. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1129, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1921-22 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 1120-21 n.1, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 n.1 (citing LAL Gear, Inc. v. Thorn
McAn Shoe Co., No. 88 Civ. 6444, 1989 WL 282850 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1990)).
[Vol. 43:1559
REVIEW OF THE 1993 TRADEMARK DECISIONS
on the shoes made confusion unlikely." Applying Second Circuit
law,5 1 a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that Melville was liable as to six shoe models.2
The majority first discerned no clear error in the district court's
ruling that L.A. Gear's Hot Shots design met the criteria of "non-
functionality."13  According to the court, if the claimed trade dress
is "essential to the use of the device, and not primarily directed to its
appearance," protection under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
unwarranted.54 Further, a design feature is not "essential" unless it
is central to the item's function; mere usefulness is insufficient."
The Federal Circuit did not disrupt the district court's finding of
nonfunctionality because alternative designs made it apparent that
athletic shoes could be produced without the Hot Shots design and
therefore established that it was unnecessary for Melville to copy L.A.
Gear's trade dress in order to compete effectively.56
Second, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's finding
that L.A. Gear's trade dress had achieved secondary meaning during
the five-month period following the introduction of the Hot Shots
design. According to the majority, "The effect of mass exposure
achievable with today's communication media can not be ignored in
determination of secondary meaning. Fashion items take readily to
development of secondary meaning upon mass media promotion, for
the fashion status of the source is often part of the commercial value
of fashion items. ''tu Applied to the facts before it, the Federal
50. Id. at 1129, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
51. Id. at 1129 n.5, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921 n.5. According to the majority:
Since unfair competition issues are not within the Federal Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction, we apply the discernible precedent of the regional circuit, in order to
avoid placing an unnecessary burden on trial courts or creating an opportunity for
appellate forum shopping by generating a separate body of substantive or procedural
law. I
Id. (citation omitted); see also infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing applicable
Second Circuit case law).
52. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1121, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
53. Id. at 1130, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
54. Id. at 1129, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (citing Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc.,
809 F.2d 971, 977, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2026, 2030 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(1988) (allowing for civil suit under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act where infringer misrepresents
its product so as to cause confusion of similar products).
55. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1129-30,25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1922 (citing LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 658 (2d Cir. 1985)).
56. Id. at 1130, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1922.
57. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1922-23. Under § 2(f) of the Lanham Act, a mark has achieved
secondary meaning when it "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f); see also infra note 143 (describing "secondary meaning").
58. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1130, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1923.
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Circuit found that L.A. Gear's heavy promotion had resulted in a
skyrocketing public demand for the Hot Shots design. 9
Finally, though agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that the
Melville and L.A. Gear shoes were substantially similar in overall
design, the Federal Circuit majority found clear error in the district
court's conclusion that purchasers of Melville shoes would likely be
confused, deceived, or mistaken into believing that they were buying
L.A. Gear shoes.60 Important to the majority's decision was the fact
that L.A. Gear shoes prominently bore the famous L.A. Gear name,
while Melville shoes prominently bore their own brand name.61
Additionally, the labels' permanence reduced the likelihood of any
post-sale confusion.62 Equally important was the majority's under-
standing that the parties' products traveled in different retail channels
and had "significant price differences," and the majority's perception
of the relative sophistication of purchasers who frequent discount
stores. 3 The majority held that the district court erred in finding
consumers "unsophisticated" and "casual" in their purchase of
discount athletic shoes: "Purchasers in discount stores are sufficiently
sophisticated... to know whether they are buying the cheaper copies
or the expensive originals."'
A mere mistake of fact, however, does not constitute reversible
error unless clearly erroneous, a finding that the majority did not
expressly make in L.A. Gear. Indeed, Judge Mayer, in a thoughtful
dissent, highlighted the appropriate standard of review,' noting that
the district court's "findings of fact en route to its conclusion are
entitled to 'considerable deference,'" and concluding that "[t]he
district court's findings on the [likelihood-of-confusion] factors are
amply supported by the evidence in the record, are not clearly
erroneous, and all weigh in favor of its determination that a likeli-
hood-of-confusion exists." 6
6
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1134, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1926.
61. Id. The court held that "the conspicuous and permanent placement of the trademarks
of LA. Gear as well as the copyist, and the sophistication of purchasers of fashion athletic shoes,
clearly outweigh the similarities in the shoe design, insofar as consumer confusion as to source
is avoided." Id.
62. Id.
63. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1925.
64. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1926.
65. Id. at 1135, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1926-27 (Mayer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
66. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1926 (quoting Lois Sportswear, U.S., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
799 F.2d 867, 873, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1986)).
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B. Likelihood of Confusion
1. Effect of consent agreements
One option for an applicant faced with a refusal to register a
trademark under section 2 (d) of the Lanham Act6 7 is to seek consent
to registration and use from the owner of the prior registration.'
In some cases, registrations have been granted based on consent
agreements, resulting in the reversal of section 2(d) registration
refusals.69 In other cases, however, likelihood of confusion was
found and registration refused despite a consent agreement.70
Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has appeared to
accept the trend grudgingly, the Federal Circuit has clearly moved
toward giving consent agreements near determinative weight in the
likelihood-of-confusion calculus. 1
In In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd.,72 the Federal Circuit continued the
trend of giving great weight to consent agreements. The Federal
Circuit reversed the Board's refusal to register the mark FOUR
SEASONS BILTMORE of Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. for resort
innkeeping services." Applying section 2 (d) of the Lanham Act, the
Board had refused to register the service mark based on the perceived
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988) (requiring Commissioner of Patent and Trademark Office
to refuse to register mark that is so similar to another registered mark as to cause confusion).
68. SeeTRADEMARKMANUALOFEXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1207.01(c) (viii), at 1207-09 (Mary
Collette Cipparone ed., 1993) [hereinafter TMEP] ("A consent agreement may be submitted by
the applicant in order to overcome a bar to registration under § 2(d) of the Act, or in
anticipation of such a refusal to register.").
69. See, e.g., In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1363, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
563, 568 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (noting that "scales of evidence are clearly tilted" against finding of
confusion when parties enter into consent agreement); In reThe Shoe Works, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1890, 1892 (T.TAB. 1988) (holding that where consent agreement is explicit and
detailed, it is entitled to great weight); In reFieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142,
1143-44 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (basing determination that no confusion existed on parties explicit
consent agreement); In re Palm Beach, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 785, 786-88 (T.T.A.B. 1985)
(determining that opinion of experienced businessmen expressed in consent agreement should
be given more weight than determination ofjudge or attorney who has little experience with
product).
70. See, e.g., In reUnited States Shoe Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938, 1940 (T.T.A.B. 1988)
(finding that consent agreements are but one factor in evaluating confusion and are not
determinative); In re Benchmark Valuation Consultants, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586, 1587
(T.TAB. 1988) (concluding that, despite weight given to consent agreement, confusion would
still result); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691, 692 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (finding that
consent agreement does not necessarily rebut conclusion of Examining Attorney that confusion
exists).
71. See TMEP, supra note 68, § 1207.01(c) (viii) (noting that number of recent Federal
Circuit decisions "criticize the Office for failing to accord the relevant consent agreements
sufficient weight in the likelihood of confusion determination .... The clear message from the
Federal Circuit is that consent agreements are to be accorded great weight.").
72. 987 F.2d 1565, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
73. In reFour Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1566, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1071
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
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likelihood of confusion with a previously registered mark, THE
BILTMORE LOS ANGELES, of T.A.T. Los Angeles Co. Ltd. (T.A.T.),
for hotel services.74 The Board found a likelihood of confusion
based on the close similarity of the marks and underlying services,
giving little or no weight to a written consent agreement between
Four Seasons and T.A.T.75 On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed
the recurring issue of how much value the agreement should be
accorded in determining likelihood of confusion 76 and reversed the
Board's ruling.7
7
Under the standard set forth in Four Seasons, if the agreement
contains more than mere consent, that is, if the agreement tends to
show that the parties "'thought out their commercial interests with
care,"' the agreement shall be given "substantial weight" in the section
2(d) determination.78 Indeed, "in the absence of contrary evidence,
a consent agreement itself may be evidence that there is no likeli-
hood-of-confusion. 79
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1567, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
76. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. The question of the proper weight to be accorded
consent agreements in determining likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act
is not new to the Federal Circuit or its predecessor court. See, e.g., Amalgamated Bank v.
Amalgamated Trust & Say. Bank, 842 F.2d 1270,1275,6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (chiding Board for not "hav[ing] heeded the admonition of the CCPA in DuPont" to give
weight to consent agreement); Bongrain Int'l (Am.) Corp. v. Deflce de France, Inc., 811 F.2d
1479, 1485, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (criticizing Board's "misguided
efforts" in taking "it upon itself to prove facts quite unnecessarily and by reasoning entirely its
own, to establish a case of likelihood of confusion when not asked to do so."); In re N.A.D. Inc.,
754 F.2d 996, 998, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that consent
agreement is evidence that "competitors clearly thought out their commercial interests with
care," and recognizing that it is "highly unlikely that they would have deliberately created a
situation in which the sources of their respective products would be confused by their
customers"); In re United Oil Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1341, 1344, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 491-92
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding that consent letter taken together with other evidence lends support
to conclusion that confusion is unlikely); In re Superior Outdoor Display, Inc., 478 F.2d 1388,
1391, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 151, 152-53 (C.C.PA 1973) (holding that consent letter taken
together with other elements compels conclusion that confusion is absent); In re EI. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 568 -(C.C.P.A 1973)
(concluding that consent absent more is insufficient to waive application of§ 2(d)); In re Nat'l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 946, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, 275 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
(presuming that parties to consent agreement are familiar with market and consumer practices).
77. In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1566, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1071
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 1569,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting N.A.D., 754 F.2d at 998,224 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 970). The court went on to observe that "[t]he agreement here between Four Seasons
and TAT. is more than a mere consent allowing applicant to register the mark." Id.
79. Id. (citing Bongrain, 811 F.2d 1479, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775); SuperiorOutdoorDsplay,
478 F.2d 1388, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 151; E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563).
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2. Ex parte refusals under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act
In In re Shell Oil Co.," a divided panel of the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's refusal to register
the service mark RIGHT-A-WAY and arrow design l for service
station oil and lubrication services under section 2 (d) of the Lanham
Act.82  A federal service mark registration existed for the nearly
identical mark RIGHT-A-WAY and arrow design for "distributorship
services in the field of automotive parts."83 The Board had affirmed
the Examining Attorney's registration refusal, holding that confusion
was likely given the close resemblance of the marks and their use in
automotive services.84 Reviewing de novo the ultimate question of
whether a likelihood of confusion existed, and reviewing for clear
error the factual findings upon which the likelihood-of-confusion
determination was made, the Federal Circuit declined to overturn the
Board's ruling.85
The court agreed with the Board that the words "RIGHT-A-WAY"
dominate both marks "and that their differences in script and arrow
design do not diminish their substantial identity when viewed as a
whole," and that the identical dominant features weighed heavily
against the applicant.86 The court similarly agreed that "the filing
of a disclaimer with the Patent and Trademark Office does not
remove the disclaimed matter from the purview of determination of
likelihood-of-confusion."87 Although recognizing that the services
with which the marks were used were not identical, the court agreed
with the Board that the "registrant's automotive parts distributorship
services and [applicant's] service station oil change and lubrication
services were related, and would be so perceived by consumers."88
Taking into consideration the extent of consumer confusion, the
court rejected the applicant's contention that "the number of
consumers of the registrant's services is small, and thus that confusion
80. 992 F.2d 1204, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
81. The design under dispute was the words "Right-A-Way" with an arrow running beneath
the words and forming the middle letter A. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1205, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1205, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688 (naming RA. Industries, Inc. as previous
owner of mark).
84. Id. at 1206, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
85. Id. at 1206, 1209, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688, 1691.
86. Id. at 1206, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
87. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
88. Id. at 1207, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
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would be de minimis." The court disagreed, noting that "the rights
flowing from federal registration do not vary with the size of the
registrant," and even more important, that the number would not be
de minimis when compared to the total number of the registrant's
potential customers.9 Addressing the sophistication of purchasers,
the court distinguished the case from those in which prospective
purchasers were highly sophisticated and very discerning.9 In
conclusion, the court reminded the applicant of its duty as a
"newcomer" to avoid confusion, and ruled that any doubts regarding
confusion should be resolved against the newcomer.92
In a stinging dissent, Judge Michel asserted that the record did not
support the Board's conclusion and characterized the Board's
decision as "rank speculation."93 According to the dissent, there was
absolutely no evidence in the record to support the Board's finding
of who comprised the purchasers of registrant's services, rendering
that finding a mere assumption, and clearly erroneous by defini-
tion.94 The dissent, however, went on to engage in "rank specula-
tion" as well. Without pointing to anything in the record for support,
Judge Michel declared that, as a matter of judicial notice, all Shell
service stations bear the Shell name and its famous Pectin design. 5
Therefore, according to the dissent, "even unsophisticated motorists
would not be confused"9" because "[g]as station patrons, including
registrant's customers, understand that major oil companies" do not
offer oil changes or other services provided by their competitors.97
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1209, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691; see Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v.
Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713,718,21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(finding confusion unlikely because purchasers were sophisticated customers of applicant's
battery chargers and opposer's computer service systems); Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786 (lst Cir. 1983) (holding that
purchasers of cardiovascular medicines and prefilled syringes are distinct professionals unlikely
to be confused with purchasers of computerized blood analysis machines).
92. Id. (citing In reHyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463,464-65, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
93. Id. (MichelJ., dissenting) (calling for reversal of decision on existing record or remand
for new findings).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1210, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1210-11,26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1692. As the majority correctly noted, " [a ] lthough Shell
argues that its use of RIGHT-A-WAY would be in association with other Shell trademarks, the
proposed registration is not so limited. Registrability is determined based on the description
in the application, and restrictions on how the mark is used will not be inferred." Id. at 1207-08
n.4, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690 n.4 (citingJ &J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932
F.2d 1460, 1463, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1889, 1892 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Octocom Sys. Inc. v.
Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937,942, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
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3. Opposition proceedings
In Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc.,9" the Federal Circuit reviewed an
interesting Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decision, in which the
Board had sustained in part and dismissed in part an opposition
based on a likelihood of confusion under section 2 (d) of the Lanham
Act.99 Theon, Inc. applied for federal registration of its trademark
DERMAJOY as applied to a single-gel skin-care preparation in two
different trademark classes: as a cosmetic in International Class 3 and
as a pharmaceutical in International Class 5.10 Jean Patou, Inc.
(Patou), owner of a federal trademark registration for JOY as applied
to perfumes and toilet waters, opposed Theon's registration.l1 '
Patou claimed a likelihood of confusion between the parties' marks,
relying on its federal registration and its prior use of JOY on "a line
of various other cosmetics sold under the mark, including soaps, bath
powders, body lotions, bath gels, and body creams."
102
Because there was no question that Patou had owned and regis-
tered its mark before Theon, Inc. applied to register its trademark,
the Board focused on the likelihood-of-confusion issue. The Board
concluded that confusion was likely with respect to Theon's applica-
tion for registration in Class 3 for cosmetic preparations, but that
confusion was unlikely with respect to Theon's application for
registration in Class 5 for pharmaceuticals.0 3 Accordingly, the
Board sustained the opposition to Class 3, but dismissed the opposi-
tion to Class 5.1°4 The Board distinguished the classes on the
grounds that the relevant public would not expect that a perfume and
cosmetic maker would also market itch-relieving medicated gels.105
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision as to
the goods in Class 3, but reversed as to Class 5.1° Of critical
importance was the fact that Theon made only one product, a gel that
functioned both as a pharmaceutical and as a cosmetic. 107 The
court rejected the Board's differing treatment of the classes, stating
that "there being only one product involved in this case, it cannot be
98. 9 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
99. SeeJean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 973. The descriptions on the packaging of the specimens stated that the gel
product functioned both as a cosmetic and as a pharmaceutical. Id. at 972-73.
101. Id. at 973.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. See id. at 973-74.
104. See id. at 974.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 976.
107. Id. at 975.
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that its marketing under the DERMAJOY trademark is both likely and
not likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive under section
1052(d) with respect to the same goods marketed by opposer under
its trademark JOY."1 8 The court noted that the benefits of a federal
trademark registration on the principal register "apply with respect to
the goods named in the registration without regard to the class or
classes named in the registration," and held that the trademark's
"classification is wholly irrelevant to the issue of registrability under
section 1052(d), which makes no reference to classification."1" The
court concluded that registration of the mark for the goods listed in
Class 5 would unnecessarily complicate the Board's decision to deny
registration of the mark for the goods listed in Class V"
C. Priority
In Martahus v. Video Duplication Services, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's decision granting
a petition by Video Duplication Services, Inc. (Video) to cancel a
federal service mark registration owned by Maracorp, Inc. for Video
Cassette Duplication Services (VCDS) and denying Maracorp's cross-
petition to cancel Video's federal service mark registration for "VDS"
in connection with the same services.1 12  Because the parties in
Martahus did not dispute that their respective marks were likely to be
confused given similarities between the marks, underlying services,
and channels of trade, the critical issue before the Federal Circuit was
priority of use." 3 The Martahus decision illustrates one of the harsh
realities that can result from an overzealous registrant's attempt to
stop what it believes is an infringement of its service mark rights when
the registrant fails to recognize that the alleged infringer in fact has
priority of use and the right to cancel the registrant's existing federal
service mark registration.
In Martahus, Carl A. Martahus, doing business as Video Cassette
Duplication Services, applied for a federal service mark registration of
the acronym VCDS in June 1986 and was issued a registration in
108. Id. at 975-76; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988) (refusing to allow registration of
trademark that may be confused or mistaken with currently registered mark).
109. Jean Patou, 9 F.3d at 975.
110. Id.
111. 3 F.3d 417, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
112. Martahus v. Video Duplication Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 419, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846,
1848 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 421, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
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March 1987.114 Martahus' business opened its first office in May
1985, and its registration reflected that date as its first use in
commerce."' Approximately three years after being issued the
registration, Martahus demanded that Video discontinue using the
acronym VDS, asserting Martahus' federal registration against Video
and claiming that his company had superior rights in the similar
acronym VGDS." 6 In response, Video filed a petition to cancel the
VCDS registration. 7
During the course of the cancellation proceeding before the Board,
the Patent and Trademark Office issued Video a federal service mark
registration for the acronym VDS, which Martahus, in turn, cross-
petitioned to cancel.' In its decision, the Board found that Video
had used the acronym VDS, at least as a trade name, before Martahus
used the acronym VCDS as a service mark, and granted Video's
petition for cancellation of Martahus' VCDS registration."9 The
Board also dismissed Martahus' cross-petition because Martahus had
failed to establish any use of the VCDS acronym before Video's first
service mark use of the VDS acronym. 2 Martahus appealed both
issues to the Federal Circuit.'21
Applying the standard of proof to cancel a trademark to service
marks, the court held that "one seeking cancellation of... a [service
mark] registration must rebut th[e] presumption [of validity] by a
preponderance of the evidence as in any other cancellation proceed-
ing." 122 In granting Video's petition for cancellation of the VCDS
registration, the court agreed that Video had submitted sufficient
evidence to rebut the VCDS registration's presumption of validity.12 1
The court relied primarily on Video's multipurpose form, which
114. Id. at 419, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. The registration was issued in the name of
Martahus d/b/a Video Cassette Duplication Services, before being transferred to Maracorp, Inc.
Id. at 418 n.1, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848 n.1.
115. Id. at 423 n.7, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852 n.7. Martahus unsuccessfully attempted to
prove a date of first use in commerce earlier than the May 1985 date claimed in its registration.
Id. Proving a first use date earlier than the date claimed in its registration requires more than
a preponderance of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence must be shown. See Hydro-
Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1470, 1473, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1772,
177-74 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring increased evidentiary burden because change from position
against own interest requires enhanced substantiation); Elder Mfg. Co. v. International Shoe Co.,
194 F.2d 114, 118, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 330, 332 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (requiring evidence of earlier
date to be free of contradictions, inconsistencies, and indefiniteness).
116. Martahus, 3 F.3d at 419, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 423, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
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documented its first sale of services in March 1985, and which bore
the initials VDS in a number of places, as well as Martahus' admission
that he did not provide any video duplication services prior to May
1985.124 These factors established that Video had priority over
Martahus and that the VODS registration should be canceled.'2
The court declined to cancel Video's VDS registration because
Martahus had not met his burden of establishing that he made at
least trade name use of VCDS before Video's first service mark use of
VDS.126
D. Primarily Geographically Descriptive Marks
In In re Compagnie Generale Maritime,1 27 a divided panel 28 of the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision refusing registration for
the stylized mark FRENCH LINE, as applied to an extensive list of
goods and services, on the ground that the mark was primarily
geographically descriptive under section 2(e) of the Lanham Act."2
The applicant, a French corporation, sought a number of registrations
under section 44(e) of the Lanham Act'e" and based its correspond-
ing applications on a variety of French registrations.13 1
Writing for the court, Judge Michel upheld the registration refusal,
explaining that "[w]hile we might perhaps have reached a different
outcome with respect to some of the goods or services in question
had we conducted de novo review, we cannot say that [the applicant]
has shown that the Board was clearly erroneous in its findings
here." 132  With regard to the Board's finding that a "potential
purchaser of goods or services under the mark 'FRENCH LINE'
would believe that the products or services came from France," 33
Judge Michel found no clear error based on "newspaper clippings
discussing, inter alia, party dresses from France, children's fashions
from France, and French designer clothes, respectively, as 'French
124. Id. at 422, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
125. Id. at 422-24, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851-53.
126. Id.
127. 993 F.2d 841, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
128. In re Compagnie Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d 841,843 n.3, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652,
1653 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (splitting over issue of Board jurisdiction, which majority did not think
was implicated, but which dissent thought was not subject to waiver).
129. Id. at 842-44,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653-55; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1988) (providing
for denial of registration when mark merely describes good or good's geographical origin or
surname).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (allowing mark registered in foreign country to be registered on
principal register of United States).
131. Compagnie Generae, 993 F.2d at 842-43, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
132. Id., 993 F.2d at 845, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
133. Id. at 844, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
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line[s], ' ' l and another "clipping referring to a certain brand of
cosmetics from France as a 'French line of cosmetics."' 35
Chief Judge Nies, dissenting,136 would have decided the case on
purely jurisdictional grounds, writing: "(1) that the [Patent and
Trademark Office] acted ultra vires in accepting and processing as
applications the subject submissions which do not comply with the
statutory requirements for an application and (2) that by ruling on
the merits, this court is rendering merely an advisory opinion."137
Even though the parties had not raised the jurisdictional issue on
appeal, ChiefJudge Nies wrote that "' [a] court may and should raise
the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears in
doubt."'13 8 In fact, at oral argument, the Chief Judge asked for
supplemental briefing on the issue, and the parties obliged.3 9 At
a minimum, the Federal Circuit's decision in Compagnie illustrates that
one can never be completely prepared for oral argument before the
Federal Circuit.
E. Merely Descriptive Marks
Numbers, like any other trademark format, may function both as
trademarks to indicate origin1" and as descriptions of the goods
with which they are sold.14' Under section 2(e) of the Lanham Act,
symbols, including numbers, that function merely or solely as grade,
134. Id. at 845, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 847, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657 (Nies, CJ., dissenting).
138. Id. at 848, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (quoting Arctic Comer, Inc. v. United States,
845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
139. See id. at 846, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656 (Friedman, J., concurring). Judge Michel
answered the dissenting ChiefJudge in a footnote of near record length, id. at 843-44 n.3, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653-54 n.3 (contending, inter alia, that failure to meet all requirements
of § 1 of Lanham Act does not preclude Board or court from having jurisdiction), and
concurring Judge Friedman answered the dissent in a textual response of equal length and
substance, id. at 845-47, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656-57 (asserting, inter alia, that court should
not decide issue that litigants did not raise, Board did not decide, or appellant did not argue
to court).
140. See, e.g., In re Petersen Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466,468 (T.TAB. 1986) (holding
letter-number combinations registrable for locking hand tools and noting that "there is no
question that such model designations can, through use and promotion, be perceived as marks
indicating origin in addition to functioning as model designations"); In re Standard Kollsman
Indus., 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 346, 347 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (holding that previously registered marks
SK-97, SK-128, SK-98, etc., were not mere model designations).
141. See, e.g., Weiser Co. v. Independent Lock Co., 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630, 631 (T.TAB.
1967) (dismissing opposition to registration because 1004A, 1127DP, and X1014F were not
exclusively associated with holder's products); Exparte Esterbrook Pen Co., 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
368, 370 (Comm'r Pat. 1956) (holding that applicant's use of number 2668 as mere model or
style designation is not trademark usage); In reUnion Oil Co., 88 F.2d 492, 494-95, 33 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 43, 44-45 (C.C.PA 1937) (holding number 76 merely descriptive for gasoline).
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style, or model designations are considered merely descriptive of the
underlying goods.14 Registration of such symbols on the principal
register can only occur if the symbol has secondary meaning, which
requires the applicant to prove to the Patent and Trademark Office
that the symbol has acquired distinctiveness under section 2 (f) of the
Act.44 The secondary meaning requirement ensures that competi-
tion is not undermined by application of the trademark law.'"
Unlike word marks whose descriptiveness may easily be determined
from the word mark and its underlying goods, numerical marks do
not lend themselves to such straightforward analysis. For example,
while it is clear that the term "slowcooker" merely describes a feature
of a Dutch oven, it would be extremely difficult without considering
the manner of use to determine whether or not the numbers 6200,
6800, and 8100 functioned as trademarks or merely described a
feature or aspect of a particular product."
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 46
the Federal Circuit addressed an issue of first impression: whether a
numerical designator is always merely descriptive in the context of an
142. In reDana Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748, 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1989). In Dana, the Board
explained:
It is well settled that terms used merely as model, style or grade designations are not
registrable as trademarks because they do not serve to identify and distinguish one
party's goods from similar goods manufactured and/or sold by others.... This is so
because such a designation serves as a description of the product, informing one of the
quality, size or type of the particular product, rather than serving as an identifier of the
source of the goods.
Id.; see also In re Petersen Mfg. Co., Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466, 468 (T.T.A.B. 1986)
(acknowledging that "words, letters, numbers, symbols and combinations of the foregoing which
are used merely as model or grade designations of a product are not valid trademarks in that
they do not serve the function of identifying and distinguishing the goods of the seller from
those of others");J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:15 (2d ed.
1984) (explaining that style or grade designations are not valid trademarks because they describe
rather than distinguish).
143. Dana, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1749 ("If, however, it is shown that the designation in
question has attained recognition by the public as a source identifier in addition to any other
function it may perform, then it may be registrable as a trademark."). Section 2(f) of the
Lanham Act provides that a mark, which when applied to "the goods of the applicant is merely
descriptive ... of them," is not subject to registration unless it "has become distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (1988). If a mark has secondary
meaning, it has also acquired distinctiveness. See IJEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
PRACTIcE § 2.03, at 2-72 (1993).
144. See Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack, 12 F. 707, 711 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1882) (protecting symbol
when symbol becomes synonymous with product); see also GILSON, supra note 143, § 2.03, at 2-59
to 2-60 (noting that competition would be impaired without secondary meaning requirement
for protection and registration of descriptive designations).
145. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Doc. Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1570,
1573,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912, 1913, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (waiting until after use had begun
to determine whether "6200," "6800," and "8100" were model designations or merely
descriptive).
146. 994 F.2d 1569,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aft'g 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1878 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
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intent-to-use registration application.' 47 The applicant, Bell &
Howell, filed federal intent-to-use applications pursuant to section
1(b) of the Lanham Act1" to register the numbers 6200, 6800, and
8100 on the principal register as trademarks for Bell & Howell's
microfilm reader/printers."' Kodak, one of Bell & Howell's
competitors, filed a timely Notice of Opposition alleging that the
numerical marks would be used solely as model designators for the
goods, making them merely descriptive of the goods and therefore
unregistrable on the principal register without proof of secondary
meaning. 50 In granting Bell & Howell's motion for summary
judgment to dismiss Kodak's Notice of Opposition, the Board held
that "it is possible for a numerical designation, which functions only
in part to designate a model or grade, to be inherently distinctive and
registrable without a showing of secondary meaning."1 51
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision,
concluding that the "Board's implied creation of a presumption in
favor of the applicant for a numerical mark intended for use as more
than a model designator is a reasonable interpretation of the Board's
authority under the Lanham Act,"152 consistent with the doctrine
established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc."'3 After a careful analysis of the relevant statutory language and
the pertinent legislative history, the court concluded that the Board's
interpretation was reasonable and did not contravene any clear and
unambiguous statutory meaning.15 4
The Federal Circuit's decision in Eastman Kodak illustrates one of
the awkward features that intent-to-use provisions have brought to the
Lanham Act. For the most part, after the Federal Circuit's decision
in Eastman Kodak, there is a presumption in favor of numerical
designators under the intent-to-use provisions of the Lanham Act that
147. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1570, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (b) (1988) (allowing applicant who alleges bona fide intent to use
mark to file application seeking registration on Principal Register).
149. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1570, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
150. Id.
151. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Doc. Mgmt. Prods. Co., 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1878,
1880 (T.T.A.B. 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 1569, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
152. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1571, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
153. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). According to Chevron, assuming "the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1571, 26
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1915 (citing Chevron U.S. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). For the agency's interpretation to be upheld, it need only be
.reasonable." See id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (pointing out that federal judges have duty
to carry out legitimate agency policies)).
154. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1574-75, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916-17.
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usually will not be defeated even in an opposition proceeding.
Indeed, despite the court's protestation to the contrary, 55 the rule
adopted in Eastman Kodak effectively eliminates a competitor's ability
to raise the issue of model, style, or grade designations successfully
against a numerical mark that is the subject of a pending intent-to-use
registration application. To be sure, the only alternative interpreta-
tion is even less inviting, namely eliminating numerical marks from
intent-to-use applications altogether.'56 Eastman Kodak aptly illus-
trates one of the many difficulties that those interpreting the Lanham
Act have inherited as a result of the intent-to-use provisions incorpo-
rated through the Trademark Law Revision Act of 19882"7
E Assignment of Section 44 Applications
Perhaps the Federal Circuit's most significant trademark decision
in 1993, at least from the perspective of trademark owners, was In re
De Luxe N. V'58 In that case, the court reversed the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board's long-standing interpretation of the Lanham Act
requiring an applicant under section 44 of the Lanham Act'59 to
own the relevant foreign application or registration both at the time
of filing in the United States and at the time of approval.60 Section
44 provides for the federal registration of a mark by a foreign entity
whose country of origin is a party to any trademark convention or
treaty to which the United States is also a party, without first requiring
the foreign entity to use the mark in commerce in the United
States.' 6' If the foreign applicant is not claiming use in commerce
155. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. While the court suggested that an "examining
attorney may [still] find numbers that are intended for use solely as model designators to be
prima facie merely descriptive," the court suggested how the attorney might reach such a
conclusion without the benefit of an admission by the applicant or specimens showing how the
mark was actually used. Id. at 1573, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
156. See id. at 1574, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (characterizing Kodak's argument as
misunderstanding Board's action). The court recognized the problem with this strained analysis:
"Kodak's analysis would eliminate the use of intent-to-use applications for any numerical mark
that could possibly be used as a model designator, in whole or in part," and correctly noted that
"the statute does not exclude from intent-to-use applications any type of mark." Id.
157. Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. I, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (governing registration and assignment of trademarks).
158. 990 F.2d 607, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988) (requiring that person filing must own foreign registration
when filing for U.S. registration).
160. See In re De Luxe, N.V., 990 F.2d 607, 608, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir.
1993). In light of the Federal Circuit's reversal of the Board's decision in De Luxe, portions of
§ 1007 of the TMEP can no longer be relied on. See TMEP, supra note 68, § 1007.01, at 1000-11
(requiring that § 44 applicant own foreign registration or application at time of filing in U.S.
or U.S. application is void).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (providing for registration and priority of marks registered in foreign
jurisdictions). For a detailed discussion of § 44 registration applications, see Beat Messerli,
REVIEW OF THE 1993 TRADEMARK DECISIONS
as a basis for the application under section 1 (a),162 a U.S. registra-
tion for the mark will not be granted "until such mark has been
registered in the country of origin of the applicant."163 Use must
begin in the United States within a reasonable time after the
registration is granted, however, to prevent abandonment of the mark
under section 45 of the Act."M The Federal Circuit's decision in De
Luxe will permit a foreign applicant for U.S. registration that satisfies
the requirements of section 44 at the time the application is filed to
successfully assign only the U.S. application, and not underlying
foreign rights, without precluding its ability to obtain U.S. registra-
tion."6 5 The practical result of the decision is to permit the free
alienation of section 44 registration applications once the statutory
application requirements are satisfied.
The De Luxe case involved two foreign applicants: De Luxe, N.V.,
the assignee of the U.S. application for registration of the mark
IVOIRE DE BALMAIN in connection with fragrances and related
cosmetics, and Balmain International, B.V., the assignor of the U.S.
application and owner of the underlying foreign registration. 66
Balmain had filed a section 44 application for the federal registration
of IVOIRE DE BALMAIN in November 1987, basing its application on
a pending Benelux application for registration of the same mark. 67
After its Benelux application was registered, Balmain submitted a
certified copy to the Patent and Trademark Office."~ After satisfy-
ing the section 44 registration requirements, Balmain then assigned
the pending U.S. application to De Luxe, and the assignment was
Registration of a Trademark Under Section 44 of the Lanham Act and the Requirement of Actual Use, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 103, 103-32 (1987).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988) (allowing owner of trademark used in commerce to apply
for registration of trademark on principal register if owner files application, pays fee, and
complies with Trademark Office rules and regulations).
163. Id. § 1126(c).
164. See id. § 1127 (defining and construing terms used in Lanham Act and, in particular,
defining prima fade case of abandonment as nonuse for two consecutive years); see also Exxon
Corp. v. Oxon Italia S.pA., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 907, 910-11 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (allowing that mark
does not have to be used in commerce to obtain registration, but if mark is not used after
registration, registration can be canceled on abandonment grounds).
165. In reDeluxe, N.V., 990 F.2d 607, 608,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1476 (Fed Cir. 1993).
166. Id.
167. Id. The Benelux registry is a common trademark registry for the countries of Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Id. at 608 n.2, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476 n.2.
168. Id. at 608, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476. This was in accord with § 44(c). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) (1988) (requiring mark's registration in country of owner's origin before mark can
be registered in United States if owner is commercially established or domiciled in country that
has treaty with United States).
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recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office records pursuant to
section 10 of the Act.169
Upon learning of the application's assignment, the examining
attorney requested De Luxe provide documentation showing that it
also had been assigned the underlying Benelux registration."'
When the documentation was not received, the examining attorney
issued a final refusal under section 1 of the Act."17  On appeal to
the Board, the examining attorney's refusal was upheld because, at
the time of publication, De Luxe was not the owner of the foreign
registration on which the U.S. application was based. 72 The Federal
Circuit framed the issue on appeal as one of first impression, namely
determining at what point in time the Act requires that a foreign
applicant base its U.S. application on its foreign registration. 71
Judge Rich, writing for the panel, agreed with De Luxe's interpreta-
tion of the Act, stating that "the language of § 44 is clear: a foreign
applicant must comply with the requirements at the time the application
isfiled; and the language of the statute neither expressly nor impliedly
restricts a foreign applicant from freely alienating a U.S. application
once the statutory requirements have been met."174  Perhaps the
best indication that Congress did not intend to limit alienation of
section 44 registration applications until after publication or registra-
tion is contained in section 10.75 In the course of amending
section 10 as part of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,176
Congress set a date other than the application's filing date before
which an intent-to-use application may not be assigned. Section 10
provides that "no application to register a mark under section 1051 (b)
... shall be assignable prior to the filing of the verified statement of
use under 1051(d)," subject to certain exceptions. 77
It will be interesting to see the impact of the De Luxe decision on
related issues. Interpreted broadly, De Luxe could be read as reversing
169. De Luxe, 990 F.2d at 608, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1060
(allowing registered marks and marks for which application for registration has been filed to be
assigned with good will of transferring business associated with mark).
170. De Luxe, 990 F.2d at 608, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
171. In re De Luxe, N.Y., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1223 (T.TAB. 1992), rev'd, 990 F.2d
607, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
172. Id. at 1223-24.
173. De Luxe, 990 F.2d at 608, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
174. Id. at 609, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477 (emphasis in original).
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1988) (permitting assignment of trademark before mark is
registered).
176. Pub. L No. 100-167, tit. I, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1060.
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the Board's decision in Nestle Co., Inc. v. Grenadier Chocolate Co.,
Ltd.," 8 where the Board held as a matter of law that when an
applicant relying solely on section 44 of the Lanham Act assigns the
U.S. application to a party not entitled to base an application on
section 44, the U.S. application becomes void.7 9
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's 1993 trademark decisions considered an
engaging mix of issues, including some issues of first impression.
Most of the Federal Circuit's decisions had something significant to
add to the court's body of trademark law precedent. The decisions
certainly reflect the court's sound judgment, maturity, intelligence,
and independent thinking concerning both procedural and substan-
tive issues.
178. 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
179. Nestle Co. v. Grenadier Chocolate Co., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 216 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
Similarly, one might wonder about the validity of the Board's holding in In re Fisons Ltd., 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 888, 891, 893 (T.T.A.B. 1978), in which the Board determined that where a §
44 applicant assigns to another party foreign applications or registrations on which the applicant
has relied for priority or as a basis for registration in the United States, if that party is not
entitled to proceed under § 44 either because that party's mark is not registered in that party's
country of origin or because that party is not the owner of the registration in the country of
origin, then the U.S. application is void.
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